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Russian Diesel Cargo Faces Five-Year Liability Risk Despite U.S. License

Yves Smith 924 views

A Treasury license clears a path for Russian diesel imports, but a statutory ban, unresolved buyer identity and five-year penalty window complicate the trade.

Russian Diesel Cargo Faces Five-Year Liability Risk Despite U.S. License

The first Russian diesel cargo heading for New York brings a market question and a legal one into sharp focus: who will accept the fuel, and what exposure comes with it? A Treasury license authorizes the shipment, but a 2022 import ban remains in force. The resulting uncertainty may deter buyers, terminals, banks and insurers even as the White House presents the trade as a way to ease fuel costs.

The Malta-flagged tanker Agioi Fanendes left Primorsk on Oct. 22 with nearly 40,000 metric tons of ultra-low-sulfur diesel. Ship-tracking data puts it at the Port of New York and New Jersey on Nov. 7. No buyer has been publicly identified. Sen. Richard Blumenthal has asked the vessel’s owner to disclose the buyer and other parties involved by Oct. 31.

The cargo is the first visible shipment tied to President Donald Trump’s Oct. 9 announcement of a diesel arrangement with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump said Russia would initially provide 300,000 tons, with volumes rising later. Treasury issued a license authorizing the trade that day. The announcement came as years of restrictions on Russian energy were colliding with a new effort to add supply to markets facing elevated prices.

A license with uncertain reach

OFAC General License 135 covers transactions connected to the sale, delivery, offloading and importation of Russian-origin diesel, including shipments to the United States. It runs through April 7, 2027. The central dispute is whether Treasury can authorize imports that Congress separately barred by statute.

Most U.S. restrictions on Russian trade rest on emergency powers used by presidents since 2014. Scott Anderson, a senior editor at Lawfare and former State Department lawyer, says Trump can likely waive restrictions based on those powers. But Congress passed the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act in 2022, putting an import ban into law for products covered by Chapter 27 of the tariff schedule, including diesel.

The statute allows a president to lift the ban only if specified conditions are met. Those include a peace agreement accepted by Ukraine’s government and advance notice to Congress. Neither has occurred. Treasury’s public explanation, posted on X, is that the license is consistent with earlier actions and complies with applicable law.

Anderson says the administration can make a plausible argument based on wording in the 2022 law that connects it to the earlier executive order. Whether a court would accept that reading is uncertain. Treasury issued several 30-day licenses this spring for Russian oil already aboard ships, aiming to ease price increases linked to the Iran war. Those licenses drew little visible resistance, though critics could argue that major changes to Russia policy required advance notice to Congress. The current authorization is broader: it lasts six months and covers future shipments.

Blumenthal has stated the opposing view plainly: the president may have issued a license, but “only Congress can make it legally valid.” That disagreement leaves commercial operators facing uncertainty before the first cargo is even unloaded.

The license is limited to diesel. Anderson sees that boundary as a possible effort to fit the arrangement within the Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, signed by Trump in September. The law defines crude oil in a way that excludes diesel, giving the administration an argument that the trade does not breach the statute’s wording. Whether that distinction fits the law’s broader purpose is less clear.

Every link in the supply chain faces questions

Importing goods in violation of federal customs law can bring criminal and civil penalties. Anderson says Trump could use his pardon power to address criminal liability for importers, but that would not remove civil exposure. Civil penalties can equal the cargo’s full value and may include forfeiture of the vessel. Customs penalties can be pursued for as long as five years after a shipment arrives.

That timeline is what makes the cargo’s commercial exposure unusually long. A company could accept the fuel under one set of conditions and face scrutiny years later, after the license has expired and the current administration has left office. The five-year period does not turn on who controls Congress or the White House when the shipment lands.

And the buyer is only one party in the chain. Someone must take ownership, a terminal must receive the ship, a bank must process payment and an insurer must cover the vessel. Each participant must assess the same unsettled legal questions. The White House did not identify who would pay for the fuel, and the buyer of this first cargo remains unknown.

Requests to preserve records have already begun. On Oct. 24, six senators and one House member asked major banks and port authorities in Texas and New York to retain shipping documents, contracts and communications with federal agencies. Three days later, Blumenthal wrote to the ship’s owner, Greek firm EASTMED, seeking the names of the seller, buyer, charterer, insurer, terminal operator and distributor, as well as information on any instructions from a federal agency.

Restrictions imposed by the United Kingdom and the European Union add another layer. Clyde & Co says banks and insurers based there cannot assist with Russian diesel shipments unless the fuel complies with the price cap. One of three tankers expected next month, the Leruo, is subject to restrictions from Britain, the EU and Canada. That can narrow the pool of service providers even where U.S. authorization is available.

Political divisions add uncertainty, but do not settle the law

Three tankers carrying about 140,000 metric tons are scheduled to reach U.S. ports from Nov. 7 through Nov. 11, though reported arrival dates have shifted. NBC News placed the Agioi Fanendes closer to Nov. 10. gCaptain withdrew a report about another shipment it had expected in Norfolk on Nov. 2.

Moscow has described the cargoes as routine. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said more tankers would follow regularly. Putin’s account of his call with Trump described Russia as ready to supply oil and oil products to U.S. and global markets, a wider offer than diesel alone.

Opposition to the arrangement crosses party lines. Four Republican senators—Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, Thom Tillis and John Curtis—joined a bipartisan statement saying the imports violate the 2022 ban. Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick has promised bipartisan legislation to block Russian oil purchases, while Senate Armed Services Chairman Roger Wicker has said he expects the imports will not occur. Trump dismissed Republican critics as “Republicans that can’t really be serious.”

The midterm results could affect how closely the trade is examined, but they will not resolve its legal status on arrival. A new Congress would not take office until January, and Trump would retain veto power. A Democratic-controlled House could pursue records and subpoenas; a change in Senate control could bring committee chairs into the inquiry. Still, the objections are not confined to one party, and the liability period extends well beyond the immediate political cycle.

Actual imports could also change who has a basis to challenge the arrangement. Anderson says competing biodiesel and renewable diesel producers might be able to sue once shipments take place. For companies considering participation, the trade therefore carries both the risk of later penalties and the possibility of litigation from commercial competitors.

Recent shifts in trade rules offer a practical warning. The Graham act passed the Senate 86 to 11 and directed Trump to impose new tariffs on major buyers of Russian oil by Oct. 18. On Oct. 16, he signed an executive order that put the duties in place and waived them in the same document. Importers have had to account for changing tariff rates in recent years. A cargo committed to at sea can encounter a different set of rules by the time it reaches port, and this arrangement brings potential vessel forfeiture into the calculation.

Ukraine and allied relations bear part of the cost

Anderson argues that Ukraine faces the heaviest strategic cost. Trump declared an “energy ceasefire” within days of the diesel announcement, without consulting Kyiv or Moscow, after Putin said Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries were raising global prices. Ukraine paused briefly and appeared to resume strikes on Russian refineries by Oct. 15, while Russia continued attacking Ukrainian energy sites. Trump later blamed Volodymyr Zelenskyy for the U.S. diesel bill.

The arrangement also leaves Washington easing pressure on Moscow while London and Brussels maintain their restrictions. The 12 senators who asked Trump to withdraw the deal called it “a betrayal of the people of Ukraine.” In Britain, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch described the move as a disappointing retreat from restrictions on Russian oil. For allied firms, the gap between U.S. authorization and European restrictions can make routine services harder to arrange.

Supply relief may be limited

The White House’s economic case rests on high diesel prices and supply concerns. Diesel traded above $6 a gallon in early October, while the Iran war constrained supply moving through the Strait of Hormuz. A Trump administration official told Semafor that accepting Russian fuel was an inevitable consequence of the conflict. Spokeswoman Taylor Rogers called the arrangement a way to supply global markets and reduce prices.

The diesel agreement is one part of a broader effort to address fuel costs. Trump also signed an order loosening rules on red-dyed diesel and urged Germany and France to release reserves. But the volume Russia can actually deliver is uncertain. Russian diesel output has fallen by about 30 percent, according to the International Energy Agency. Ukrainian attacks have damaged refineries, and Moscow had restricted exports to protect domestic supply before the arrangement.

Even if all of the 4.8 million tons Trump described arrive, that volume amounts to about 10 days of U.S. demand. Goldman Sachs estimated the supply could lower prices by only $1 to $2 a barrel. Kpler, meanwhile, says a rebound in Russian exports could change global trade flows and put pressure on Atlantic basin prices. Russian diesel exports in October were more than three times September’s level, supported by improved refinery runs.

Kpler sees potential for additional supply to reach the Mediterranean and Brazil, where reduced Russian availability has increased reliance on U.S. and Indian cargoes. Brazil could potentially regain around 146,000 barrels per day of Russian diesel. That could reduce demand for U.S. Gulf Coast exports and allow more inventory to be replenished ahead of winter.

The effects would vary by fuel. Extra diesel could weigh on diesel and gasoil prices, while jet fuel may see little relief because supply remains constrained. That divergence could widen jet fuel premiums over diesel in Europe and the United States. A larger diesel flow, then, would not necessarily ease pressure across the broader fuels market.

Anderson said global diesel prices had not moved meaningfully after the announcement. The first tanker carries roughly 300,000 barrels, a small contribution beside U.S. consumption. Yet that cargo has already prompted demands for records and raised questions about a five-year liability window. For the companies asked to handle it, the immediate commercial benefit may be modest while the legal and operational questions last much longer.

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Source: Yves Smith · www.nakedcapitalism.com

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